This is the second in a series of posts summarising and discussing “Chinese History Revisited” (中國文明的反思; transliterated, “Reflections on Chinese Civilisation”), written by Mainland journalist Xiao Jiansheng (萧建生).

The first post can be found here.

Update: Click on the tag “Chinese History Revisited” to see the entire series.

Chapter 2

Xiao turns to the Spring and Autumn Period (春秋時代) and Warring States Period (戰國時代) (collectively, 春秋戰國). The orthodox view has been of a China ravaged by war and internal division and rife with human suffering; Xiao’s argument is that this was a golden age of Chinese civilisation, featuring unprecedented levels of liberty, prosperity and creativity until the Qin (秦) unification in 221BC.

Xiao attempts to place the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (東周) (under which the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods occurred) in context by analysing the origins of the Western Zhou Dynasty (西周) which preceded it. The Zhou Dynasty began as a reaction to the brutality shown by the Shang Dynasty (商朝) (which itself was a reaction to the brutality of late Xia (夏) rulers). The victory of the Western Zhou was not due to the strength of its army, but to slave defections; as a result, political and legal institutions underwent major changes. Xiao identifies three main features of the Western Zhou era: feudal devolution, the civic participation of Guo Ren (國人) - for present purposes, “Citizens”), and the system of ritual and etiquette (周禮 - transliterates as “Zhou rites”).

Palmerston: Xiao’s terminology actually has overtones of federalism, rather than devolution; however, the top-down nature of the feudal system arguably suggests that the latter is more comparable.

Among the first acts of the new Western Zhou Dynasty was to grant feudal fiefdoms to blood relations of the King, aristocrats and other benefactors of the realm. Feudal lords had regional autonomy and direct rule was only imposed with a 1,000 li (Chinese miles; subsequent references to “miles” are to Chinese miles) radius of the capital. Feudal lordships were hereditary and could not be revoked. (In contrast, the province/prefecture system subsequently put in place by the Qin Dynasty involved local officials who could be appointed and removed at will.) Fiefdoms were further divided and subinfeudated to lesser nobles. In this system, feudal lords were held to account not only by the King (who would dispatch inspectors and whose approval was required for certain decisions), but also by their vassals.

The other players in the Western Zhou polity were the citizens. Distant blood relations of the King (originally descended from lesser nobles but who had lost their aristocratic status), Citizens were soldier-farmers who had their own landholdings and were entitled to elect (and comment on the performance of) local officials. By virtue of their status, citizens were entitled to be consulted on matters of national security, feudal succession and other major national affairs. This system, Xiao argues, provided for a body politic with multiple centres of power, each curbing the excesses of the other. However, as Xiao acknowledges, citizenship was confined to those with blood ties to the King; those not of royal descent were denied landholdings and were not entitled to participate in military service.

Palmerston: Xiao does not draw this comparison directly, but non-citizens - be they farmers or craftsmen - were, in essence, serfs.

The entire system was held together with a strongly enforced system of rituals and rites to maintain the feudal pecking order. Certain dances were limited to certain social strata; going above one’s station by engaging in acts reserved for one’s betters was a grave offence. Likewise, funeral rites were strictly regulated - and impiety strictly punished.

However, these regulations were accompanied by what Xiao characterises as enlightened legal reforms. Certain forms of torture and capital punishment were abolished. Collective punishment for crimes was scrapped. Sentencing was based on the views collected from various social levels. The use of torture to extract evidence was abandoned. Judges were subject to punishment for procuring false convictions, and there existed a means to bring appeals directly to the King’s attention.

Yet, despite these relatively enlightened features, the Western Zhou Dynasty would not last - a combination of wars against foreign invaders and natural disasters put considerable pressure on the royal treasury and on the citizens. Ultimately the King was forced to move his capital eastwards, ushering in the Eastern Zhou Dynasty. This period was marked by the further erosion of royal power and the unchecked growth in the power of feudal lords - who, in due course, elevated themselves to sovereigns. Sima Qian (司馬遷) documents 36 assassinations, 52 states destroyed and countless warlords foced into exile.

The Spring and Autumn Period witnessed a remarkable expansion of civil liberties in order to allow open debate and attract administrative talent - among other innovations, the first promulgation of a legal code by any Chinese ruler happened during this period. Public opinion became increasingly important; citizens were able to participate directly in political activities. What was a wholly new development, however, was the emergence and recognition of private property, giving rise to the alienation of land and the ability to trade. The emergence of taxation points to official recognition of private property rights and the right to trade.

Even in the field of international relations, Xiao asserts, the Spring and Autumn Period was remarkably advanced. Although China was unified in name only, hegemons of the time adopted the overarching policy of recognising the Zhou Dynasty as ruler de jure and expelling foreign invaders; Xiao also documents a system of diplomacy and rules of war based on the Zhou ritual system.

Xiao’s question, in light of all these developments, is why there was no transition to a pluralistic democracy. He identifies 3 main factors: geography, a lack of democratic politicians, and the disappearance of the citizenry.

First, the absence of geographical features clearly dividing state from state meant that there were no geographical checks on military expansionism. As a result, states moved to build up their armies, ultimately resulting in a shift in values in favour of opportunism and power politics.

Second, unlike in Ancient Greece, even the most enlightened of Spring and Autumn rulers never thought to create fully democratic institutions - Xiao refers to this as a period filled with missed opportunities. Based on the ideas of FA Hayek, Xiao claims that the Zhou system of rites, with its emphasis on inheritance, piety and the social hierarchy, made it difficult to conceive of an election by, and of, equals. In contrast, in Ancient Greece, wealth had a lot less to do with power and blood ties - making the conditions for a free market more readily transferrable to the body politic.

Third, the end of the feudal system and the recognition of private property spelled the end of the citizen as a distinct political class. A citizen might have to sell his own land due to poverty; conversely, someone with no royal blood might, through his own efforts, acquire land, wealth and influence. The end of the citizenry as a class meant that they no longer had to be consulted, nor could they act as a counterbalance to official power.

Xiao argues that, as the Spring and Autumn Period gave way to the Warring States Period, Chinese Legalist (法家) political opportunists came to the fore and hastened the change to dictatorial absolutism. By way of illustrative example, Xiao goes on, at some length, about the Legalist reforms by Shang Yang (商鞅) in the Qin state. Among these were an obsessive emphasis on agricultural production and military prowess, the ruthless - and brutal - suppression of all dissent and competing ideologies, collective punishment and the institution of direct rule by centrally-appointed administrators. The reason why such reforms were possible in Qin, Xiao argues, is that the state was, at the time of its foundation, a primitive tribe rather than a feudal fiefdom - and was therefore much less affected by Zhou rituals and rites.

Xiao then proceeds to examine the various schools of philosophical thought then existing. Daoism, Xiao argues, is closest to Christianity in its premise that true knowledge is not arrived at by intellect - but, unlike Christianity, Daoism did not find favour in its day.

Confucianism identified the problem of the age as being the usurpation of Royal rights and prerogatives and the resulting jockeying for power, and advocated a return to the Western Zhou rites system - but offered no concrete policy proposals. Even Mencius (孟子), who developed Confucian thought by pushing it in a more overtly political direction, did not advocate vesting sovereignty in the people - but by Mencius’ time the citizens had disappeared as a political force; the only option left was to emphasise humane government rather than a return to the Western Zhou system. However, Xiao argues that Confucian thinkers could never advocate any ideas involving the limitation of sovereign power - because they knew that that was how their bread was buttered. While some Confucians in the later Warring States period opposed hereditary feudalism entirely, by that time Qin unification was inevitable; even later Confucian thinkers (during the Western Han Dynasty) even sought to justify absolute monarchy.

Xiao’s views on Legalism should already be clear - but he acknowledges that Legalism stood alone in offering political measures and proposals that could actually be implemented. Xiao argues that, after the Western Han period, Legalism and the (debased) Confucianism became the political and ideological pillars of Imperial absolutism.

Mohism (墨家), by contrast, posed a series of questions which proved rather inconvenient to the ruling elite of their day - and, Xiao asserts, was the first (and clearest) school of thought to advocate the abolition of noble privileges and the implementation of general civic participation. Mohist thought was highly influential in the Spring and Autumn Period, especially with citizens - but its fortunes waned with those of the citizens as a political class. Indeed, Qin ascendancy and the grave threats facing the various states during the Warring States Period hugely favoured the Legalists. Xiao draws a contrast with Ancient Greece, the teachings of Aristotle and the flourishing of Greek democracy.

Palmerston: The general ideas Xiao espouses are sound, but the chapter as a whole suffers from a bad case of overreach. At one point (in discussing the abolition of slavery and human sacrifice in the Western Zhou Dynasty) Xiao argues, somewhat disingenuously, that the sale of slaves in the 19th-Century United States did not make that society a slavery-based society. In his analysis of Daoism, Xiao again draws spurious links with Christianity and sings the praises of the Old and New Testaments, but curiously fails to condemn the collective punishment found throughout the Old Testament (while excoriating collective punishment when it occurs in Shang and Qin societies). Nor does Xiao address the challenge posed by Plato’s Republic, instead choosing only to discuss Aristotle’s Politics. These are serious omissions that gravely undermine the strength of Xiao’s case.

What is particularly regrettable is that Xiao doesn’t even have to push his arguments that far. In Palmerston’s view, all that Xiao has to show is that the ideological underpinnings for a capitalist liberal democracy are not “foreign” and have a Chinese historical basis - this would be sufficient to destroy the “Asian Values” fallacy advanced by, amongst others, Lee Kuan Yew. Instead, in whitewashing Western and Judaeo-Christian civilisation, Xiao goes much further than he needs to - and, in so doing, damages his own credibility.

Edits:

Typo editing - changed “faced” to “posed” in discussion of Plato’s Republic.

Further edit to fix broken link to first post.

Removal of references to the US War of Independence and Civil War (which are discussed in Chapter 3).?