This is the third in a series of posts summarising and discussing “Chinese History Revisited” (中國文明的反思; transliterated, “Reflections on Chinese Civilisation”), written by Mainland journalist Xiao Jiansheng (萧建生).
Click on the tag “Chinese History Revisited” to see the entire series.
In Chapter 3 Xiao turns his attention to the Qin Dynasty (秦朝). The prevailing orthodoxy has long been that Qin unification reflected historical trends and the wishes of the people; in keeping with previous chapters, Xiao turns this analysis on its head and argues that the Qin era was, in fact, an abject disaster for the Chinese people.
Xiao begins by dispelling the common conception that Qin Shihuang (秦始皇) was the first to unify China; that grand political aim was first achieved in the Western Zhou Dynasty (discussed in Chapter 2). However, the devolved feudalism in place during that period meant that China, while unified, was not subject to an autocratic government.
The author then turns to the process by which Qin overran the other six States during the Warring States Period. Xiao’s argument is that Qin failed to adhere to both the prevailing jus ad bellum (laws governing justification for war) and the jus in bello (laws on the conduct of war). Xiao begins from the premise that the Shang and Zhou uprisings, which were both targeted at oppressive regimes, amounted to just wars.
Palmerston: In relation to the Zhou uprising, Xiao points to the absence - or relative absence - of battles, intrigue and atrocities. This seems altogether too glib - as does his dismissal of objections to the Zhou campaign. Xiao also refers to the peaceable union of the United States, while conveniently glossing over the War of Independence and the American Civil War.
Xiao’s starting point is that in the Spring and Autumn Period the declaration of war had to be justified - the hegemons of the time waged war in defence of the Zhou dynastic line and to expel foreign invaders. War could not be waged against another State if (for example) it abided by the Zhou rites, or if there was a State mourning period in progress. In contrast, Xiao argues, Qin waged unjustified wars of aggression - largely because of its origins as a primitive tribe rather than a feudal State and its consequent minimal adoption of Zhou rites.
Palmerston: Even today there is no agreement on what a “war of aggression” actually is, as the continuing difficulties which plague the International Criminal Court suggest.
When the Zhou dynasty relocated its capital eastwards, Qin was tasked with repelling the Xiong Nu (匈奴; Central Asian nomads) from the Western territories. Instead, Qin launched numerous attacks into Central China. Indeed, archaeologists have discovered that the royal tombs of 5 Qin monarchs faced East, suggesting long-standing territorial ambitions. Xiao suggests that this was because the Western territories were far less compelling than the riches to be found in Central China.
Xiao also finds cause for complaint in the manner in which Qin armies waged war. Not only were such wars undeclared, they also relied on surprise attacks - which, by the standards of the time, simply weren’t cricket. Some records suggest that over a million deaths resulted from merely 4 of the 22 Qin campaigns - including, the Shiji (史記) reports, the massacre of 450,000 POWs after a single campaign. Viewed in light of China’s population at the time of just over 20 million, these numbers are staggering - and the brutality of subsequent post-Qin reprisals gives, Xiao argues, some indication of the regard in which Qin war conduct was held.
In any event, the results of Qin aggression and intrigue were, Xiao claims, obvious - other States were forced to abandon the moral codes from the Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn periods in favour of brutal, bare-knuckle realpolitik. By the later Warring States Period, the ruling classes were entirely obsessed with power and its accumulation. Even if unification was a just cause, Xiao argues, the means employed to achieve it irredeemably taint the result. Xiao identifies all of these ills as having arisen after the Legalist changes put in place by Shang Yang (商鞅).
Qin unification brought about a unitary body politic, purportedly as a response to the disputes between fiefdoms brought about by feudalism. Yet, while such a system suited the megalomaniac tendencies of Emperors just fine, the lack of countervailing political entities (as seen in the Western Zhou period) resulted in an unstable bipolar society: ruler and ruled - authoritarianism with the former in charge; insurrection when the latter had the upper hand. This arrangement, Xiao argues, brought about a millennia-long vicious cycle of oppression and revolt.
What, Xiao asks, were the real lessons to be learned from the failure of the Western Zhou system? After a short digression discussing Alexis de Toqueville’s tract on the United States, he praises the limited autonomy for towns and villages, the “checks and balances” (after a fashion) and the civic participation present in Western Zhou society. In contrast, a system of centralised rule where bureaucrats are only answerable to their superiors brings about, Xiao asserts, corruption and exploitation. There is, in Xiao’s argument, good reason why the Qin dynasty crumbled after 14 years, but the Zhou dynasties lasted nearly a millennium.
Xiao does not deny that the Western Zhou system had foibles. The absence of any separation of powers meant that the system could not stem its internal rot. There was no entrenchment of priate property, nor was there a market economy. Most fundamentally, however, there was no division between central and local taxation; feudal lords merely had to pay tribute. The consequent absence of a steady stream of local income meant that there was no centralised army, thereby ensuring that the feudal lords would win any conflict between royal and feudal interests. This, in turn, ultimately led to the fragmentation of China.
Xiao posits that a truly enlightened Qin Shihuang would have sought to centralise control of the army, allow autonomous regions to be governed by elected local officials, enshrine private property rights and separate central and provincial taxes. Instead, Qin Shihuang simply imposed the Legalist system previously put in place by Shang Yang, only with a much greater scale and severity.
Palmerston: Xiao claims that most of the ingredients for such a system were already there. This seems like a bit of a stretch, especially as far as central/local taxation and a centralised military are concerned.
Xiao goes on to document, in extensive detail, the numerous human rights abuses in Qin law. Collective punishment makes a return. Thoughtcrimes and crimes of expression (culminating in the notorious book-burning) are imposed. Punishments are universally heavy - Xiao describes 11 forms of capital punishment, ranging from death by trephination to The Five Pains, China’s answer to being hanged, drawn and quartered. Freedom of movement is severely curtailed by the imposition of a registration system. All private property is expropriated, and heavy taxes (including a 50% harvest tax) and labour levies (compulsory free labour for the State) imposed. Trade, which flourished under the Eastern Zhou Dynasty, is banned - traders and their families are sentenced to hard labour and their assets confiscated.
Palmerston: The registration system bears some resemblance to the contemporary hukou (戶口) system.
Xiao also laments the end to the competition between states that led to advances in diplomacy, the emergence of a market economy and the aggressive recruitment of talented people regardless of origin.
Diplomacy prior to Qin unification revolved around the Zhou rites - non-adherence to the ritual code put a State at the risk of war. By contrast, the absence of foreign powers meant that Qin absolutism went unchecked - and that there was no incentive to look beyond national borders. The author identifies the building of the Great Wall as a sign of stagnation. China’s geography led, Xiao argues, to an obsession with unity and a Sinocentric mindset amongst its ruling classes.
Palmerston: Compare the Great Wall with the construction of Hadrian’s Wall, which served a similar purpose and may also have reflected Imperial stagnation.
Xiao also briefly describes subsequent diplomatic efforts in the Han (漢) or Tang (唐) dynasties, which he claims were unsuccessful or pursued only half-heartedly - in one notable example, Eastern Han envoy Gan Ying (甘英) apparently turned tail, having been terrified by the waves of the Persian Gulf. In contrast, there was much more active pursuit of diplomacy in the Song (宋) dynasty - because, Xiao asserts, China was not unified during that period. As for Zheng He’s (鄭和) marine expeditions in the Ming (明) dynasty, Xiao criticises them for having no trade objective and being focused exclusively on bringing back luxuries for the Emperor. The subsequent 1433 edict to return and the ban on ocean-going vessels reflected a blinkered mentality which would persist well into the Qing (清) dynasty, to the extent that all coastal inhabitants were ordered to move inland by 30 (Chinese) miles.
As for trade, Xiao refers to improvements in transportation, communication, hospitality, craftsmanship, the sciences and the cultures - even to the emergence of trade authorities, foreign exchange and credit. Qin unification, with its severe limits on personal movement, its ban on private trade and its return to small-scale subsistence farming, meant the end of properity through trade and resulted in officialdom being the only outlet for anyone of ambition.
Palmerston: Xiao describes 2-piece credit instruments where the nature of the transaction was written on bamboo sticks, which were then split - comparable with indentures, in the original sense of the word.
As for those ambitions? Previously states had to scramble to recruit the best and brightest; Xiao refers, notably, to the merchant Lu Buwei (呂不韋) and his military and political contributions to Qin. All this, Xiao asserts, ended with Qin unification. (Xiao goes on, later in the chapter, to document the replacement of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States meritocracies with a centrally-appointed system of corrupt yes-men.)
Palmerston: Ironically, the very contributions Xiao lauds are the same “contributions” he criticises as being barbaric.
Xiao proceeds to document the corruption and decadence of Qin reign. The use of slave labour and the confiscation of weapons are well-known; coupled to these were a ban on private education, a harem of over 12,000 - and the obsession with the elixir of immortality. The various pet projects of Qin Shihuang required a workforce, Xiao estimates, of over 3 million - more than 15% of a population of 20 million. This pattern of decadent rule, especially in later life, would recur throughout Chinese Imperial history.
Xiao moves on to describe the Imperial bureaucracy as a system of centrally-appointed sycophants. With accountability only owed towards one’s superiors, there was every incentive to cover up problems and to bribe superiors (and to exploit the laity while doing so).
Palmerston: Xiao does not, of course, draw the parallel to contemporary Chinese bureaucracy directly - but the parallels are there for all to see.
Xiao concludes by contending that Qin Shihuang set the mould for Chinese autocracy and that all subsequent Emperors simply inherited this framework of absolute power - and that absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Palmerston: Chapter 3 is, in essence, the flip side of the coin to Chapter 2 - and suffers from many of the same foibles. Xiao’s glossing over of the US War of Independence and the American Civil War are particularly galling examples of whitewashing, to the detriment of his case.?
