This is the fifth in a series of posts summarising and discussing “Chinese History Revisited” (中國文明的反思; transliterated, “Reflections on Chinese Civilisation”), written by Mainland journalist Xiao Jiansheng (萧建生).

Click on the tag “Chinese History Revisited” to see the entire series.

Common justifications for centralised rule

Having described the foibles of local government, Xiao attacks the two most common justifications for centralised absolutist rule: economic development and national security.

It is commonly argued that centralised government increases efficiency and fosters development by allowing the concentration of resources for investment. Xiao offers two counter-examples: the Qin Great Wall - which was such an oppressive case of civil engineering it led directly to a peasants’ revolt; and the canal construction works commenced by Emperor Yang of Sui. Xiao argues that perceived efficiency is in fact directly proportional to the risk of public revolt, and that public works at the behest of a strongman are often commenced due to megalomania or a desire to line the pockets of the ruling classes. Even if such public works are genuinely in the public interest, Xiao argues, the drain on national resources is often difficult for the public to stomach.

Palmerston: Lest it be thought that this hoary old warhorse of an argument is only trotted out by the CCP, it should be noted that one of the most prominent exponents of this argument is none other than Thomas Friedman.

As for the national security argument, Xiao points out that, of the past three millennia of Chinese history, China has been unified under centralised rule for less than half that time - and that zeniths of centralised rule often immediately precede national fragmentation. Even as of today, Xiao argues, overly centralised power remains the pre-eminent threat to lasting peace and stability in China. Xiao argues that any solution to internal division requires the division of powers between central and local governments, founded on democratic elections; the absence of progress on this front since the Qin Dynasty is, in his view, the reason for the vicious cycle of autocratic corruption and populist revolt.

Consequences of “rule by men” (and by a woman)

The remainder of the chapter is devoted to explaining why the social and economic prosperity and collapse of the Han and Tang Dynasties is entirely attributable to the absence of any system of constitutional government.

Xiao acknowledges that there were periods during the Han and Tang Dynasties in which China flourished, and poses the question of why this should have occurred under absolutist rule. Xiao asserts that there were reasons why this was to be expected. Economically, the relentless exploitation of Qin rule had been abandoned in favour of laissez-faire governance, with reduced taxes and military service and the redistribution of land. Politically, Qin brutality was abandoned and the Emperors of the time respected the authority of the Chancellor and opened government to the masses. However, Xiao notes that these enlightened policies were not socially or constitutionally entrenched - and their continuation could therefore not be taken for granted. In that sense, he argues, prosperity in Han and Tang China was very much a matter of chance.

Xiao proceeds to compare the enlightened governance of Emperor Wen of Han (漢文帝) and Emperor Jing of Han (漢景帝) on the one hand with the economic exploitation and other policy regressions under Emperor Wu of Han (漢武帝). Notably, Xiao points out that Emperor Wen would never have ascended to the throne under the normal rules of Imperial succession; he was only crowned Emperor due to a combination of palace intrigue and the agreement of the Imperial ministers (after much debate) that he was of upstanding moral character. Never missing an opportunity to note a missed opportunity, Xiao argues that the ministers failed, early in Emperor Wen’s reign, to entrench this means of Imperial selection, or to impose a system entrenching ministerial powers and providing for Imperial accountability.

After Emperor Jing, Xiao argues, there is a long drought of enlightened governance until the Sui (隋) and Tang Dynasties. Xiao singles out Liu Xiu (劉秀), who established the Eastern Han Dynasty, for special criticism - not only did he drain the principal officials of any real powers, he also set up his own administrative and deliberative bureau (the 尙書檯) to undermine the Chancellor and instituted the office of Imperial spokesman to relay his edicts. Ironically, it was the latter office - supposedly a minor Imperial post - that would usurp control of the Emperor and his Court in the later years of the Eastern Han Dynasty, precipitating power struggles and the fall of the Dynasty itself. Xiao says little about the Three Kingdoms Period, save that the leaders of all three kingdoms were blinkered by Confucian thought and shared the aim of reunification by force of arms - with catastrophic effects for the populace. Xiao’s remarks on the Southern and Northern Dynasties, during which the country was divided, run along largely predictable lines; he attributes the intermingling of ethnic groups, freedom of thought and progress in literature and the Arts to the division of the country at the time.

Palmerston: Xiao, almost parenthetically, refers to the assimilation of ethnic minorities into the Han majority as a good thing. Given his previous admiration of the cosmopolitan nature of Tang China, however, perhaps he may be given the benefit of the doubt.

Xiao proceeds to give an overview of the Imperial careers of three enlightened early Tang Emperors: Emperor Taizong (唐太宗), Empress Regnant Wu Zetian (武則天) and Emperor Xuanzong (唐玄宗).

Palmerston: Technically Wu Zetian was not a Tang Dynasty emperor and sought to establish a second Zhou Dynasty. What is not in dispute, however, is that she was the only Empress Regnant in Chinese history.

Taizong was not Crown Prince and did not ascend to the throne by the rules of Imperial succession. In addition to praising his integrity and concern for the people, Xiao emphasises Taizong’s awareness of the perils of despotism and his (ultimately unsuccessful) efforts to persuade his ministers to implement a system which did not concentrate power in the Emperor personally, but avoided the fragmentation which resulted from Zhou feudalism. However, his ministers did not share his vision, nor did they wish to run the risk of political reform. As a result, yet another opportunity to transition to a democratic republic perished with Taizong.

Wu Zetian’s accession was remarkable by any standards, as was (Xiao alleges) her character. Xiao writes, at length, about her efforts to supervise officials - extending to confidential feedback boxes, the transportation of informants to the capital at Imperial expense and the execution of over 5,000 corrupt officials between 684AD and 697AD. However, Xiao is forced to admit that this anti-corruption drive was motivated, at least in part, by the elimination of political enemies - and that it involved torture to obtain false testimony. Xiao also concedes that her governance was highly capricious.

Palmerston: Xiao’s favourable appraisal of Wu Zetian is very much at odds with the values he claims to espouse. More fundamentally, this reader, for one, fails to see any distinction between Wu Zetian’s anti-corruption drive and contemporary efforts by the CCP - which only target what Xiao himself views as the symptoms of absolutism.

Xuanzong, although Crown Prince, again did not accede by the normal rules of succession; his reign was marked by unprecedented cultural, economic and social development - under his rule Chinese territory stretched from the Byzantine border and modern India and Pakistan to the Spratly Islands and the East China Sea. However, as he grew increasingly decadent in his later years, the dynasty likewise crumbled around him.

Based on these three examples, Xiao argues that the Imperial rules of succession actualy inhibited the reign of an enlightened leader - and that even the most enlightened of rulers could not break from the old mould of Imperial absolutism. The failure of Chinese civilisation, he argues, is at heart a structural problem - not one of implementation.

Palmerston: Xiao conveniently ignores the various instances of intrigue, blackmail and assassination that pushed these three Emperors to the throne - and, as set out above, skates over the less savoury aspects of Wu Zetian’s reign.

Xiao devotes considerable attention to the economic policies under Han and Tang China; it suffices to note that even the most enlightened Han and Tang rulers imposed significant restrictions on the activities of traders (with later Han and Tang rulers imposing State monopolies on vital commodities such as salt, iron and wine). Even in the early Tang Dynasty, entering or exiting Chinese territory without permission remained an offence - Xuanzang’s pilgrimage (fictionalised in Journey to the West) was, in fact, illegal.

Palmerston: Interestingly, Xiao notes that Sima Qian (of Shiji fame) was a proponent of free-market economic theory centuries before Adam Smith. Unfortunately, Emperor Wu did not adopt free-market theory, whereas 18th-century Britain did.

Xiao notes in closing that economic prosperity, cultural development and national might are not the bases for national peace and security - and that only an effective mechanism for the peaceful resolution of social disputes (in the form of participatory politics, supervisory mechanisms and democracy) can achieve that objective. Without such a system, Xiao argues, the prosperity of Han and Tang China was destined to be short-lived.

Palmerston: In terms of general impressions, there is little enough to add - Xiao seems altogether too prepared to give the benefit of the doubt to the likes of Wu Zetian, while (elsewhere in his book) criticising the use of political intrigue, the pursuit of personal vendettas and capricious or haphazard governance. The absence of detailed explanation of why the traditional arguments for centralised absolutism do not hold water is also a disappointment. As with previous chapters, the general arc of Xiao’s narrative is sound, but his willingness to gloss over inconvenient details continues to mar his analysis.