Much ink has already been spilt on the demerits of the 2012 electoral reform proposal. In light of the proposal’s imminent introduction into Legco, now is perhaps an apposite time to consider not only what the pro-establishment (to use a less pejorative term than “Royalist”) camp is trying to sell, but how it has tried to sell it.

Few words on the proposal itself are necessary, except to note that the substantive deal is less representative than the 2005 proposal. The use of progressively worse offers will, of course, be familiar to anyone with a vague interest in Mafia lore.

What is truly illuminating, however, is the manner in which the pro-establishment camp has attempted to drum up support for the current proposal.

If the current package is sufficiently good to stand on its merits, one might reasonably expect that the Chief Executive and his cabinet would have absolutely no problem with announcing their itineraries well in advance, instead of a mere two hours before appearances (when they bothered at all).

One might also expect that supporters would turn up to demonstrations of their own accord, rather than due to financial inducements (not to say “bribes”) from community associations. Or, in the case of some students, under duress from their own school administrations (link in Chinese). (NB: The school in question has rescinded the “activity” in question (link in Chinese).)

Nor would an administration confident in the merits of its proposal request a televised debate to be held in Government headquarters, in the absence of any live audience participation.

As for the notion that the local and Beijing Governments are open to cooperation with various parties (link in Chinese)? The fact that Liaison Office apparatchiks are again trotting out words like “opposition” is abundant evidence that the pan-Democrats should expect no sincerity from Beijing on the question of constitutional reform. As veteran Democrat Martin Lee (link in Chinese) warned, the CPC’s idea of negotiating is to stand firm until the other side backs down. Nothing so far has suggested that the present proposal will be an exception.

Update: A CUHK survey (link in Chinese) shows that support for the reform package has dropped below 50% of those surveyed - and, significantly, that nearly half of those surveyed did not trust Beijing to implement universal suffrage of the Chief Executive and Legco in 2017 and 2020 respectively.

And so, ultimately, after the gratuitous waste of taxpayer money (link in Chinese) on political advertising, after the astroturfing (link to Chinese pro-reform site), what does all this boil down to?

What the public faces is, in essence, Hobson’s choice: either a proposal which represents a step back from what was floated - and roundly rejected - in 2005 with no clear road map to universal suffrage, or the patently dysfunctional status quo. The sordid assortment of tactics that the Royalist camp has resorted to speaks volumes about the unpalateability of what is on offer.

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